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COURT OF APPEALS FINDS PREJUDGMENT INTEREST A SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE UNDER
ERIE DOCTRINE, AND THUS APPLIES STATE LAW GOVERNING PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the district court to be in error for
applying the federal law to determine prejudgment interest rates for recovery of
losses arising from an oil spill under Alaskan state law. Since, under the Erie
doctrine, a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state law
governing substantive legal issues, federal law can only control if there is federal
preemption of state law.
In re: The Exxon Valdez, Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
484 F . 3d 1098
(Decided April 16, 2007)
Plaintiff, Sea Hawk Seafoods ("Sea Hawk"), operates a seafood processing plant on Prince
William Sound in Valdez, Alaska.

Sea Hawk sued the defendants, ExxonMobil Corp. and Exxon

Shipping Corp ("Exxon"), for damages arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.

The defendants' oil

tanker ran aground on Bligh Reef off of Valdez on March 24, 1989, discharging 11 million gallons of oil
into Prince William Sound.

On March 31, 1989, Sea Hawk sued Exxon in Alaska state court for

damages to its business arising out of the oil spill.

Sea Hawk' s claim arose under Alaska Statutes

§ 46.0 3.822 which imposes strict liability for harm resulting from the release of a hazardous substance.
The parties reached a settlement for the losses suffered by the plaintiff on April 4, 1990.
However, plaintiff also joined in an amended and consolidated class action in federal district court. The
federal claims asserted by plaintiff were voluntarily dismissed on September 6, 1992. The plaintiff had
remaining state law claims for years other than 1989.

These claims were removed to federal court on

November 21, 1991 subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 32 governing diversity jurisdiction, with plaintiff moving
to remand these claims to state court.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and the Court of

Appeals, citing the removal of over 160 other state law cases relating to the oil spill, 1 affirmed the trial
court' s decision stating that the claims were properly removed under 28 U . S .C. § 1441(c).

The district court entered summary judgment against the plaintiff based on the holding of Robins

Dry Dock

&

Repair Co.

v.

Flint,2 holding that federal admiralty law preempted the plaintiff's state law

th
The 9 circuit reversed this decision in part and remanded, holding that federal maritime law
3
did not preempt the state law claims. The parties then reached an agreement on the remaining state law

claims.

claims, but were unable to agree on the rate of prejudgment interest to apply to the principal amount of
the settlement. The parties agreed to submit this issue to the district court. The district court relied on

Columbia Brick Works, Inc.

v.

Royal Insurance Co. of America4 to calculate the prejudgment interest

under federal law. The rate was based upon two loss dates agreed upon by the parties, one in 1992 and
one in 199 3.

The district court used these dates to calculate interest according to the treasury rate

prescribed by 28 U . S .C. § 1961(a), as was done in

Western Pacific Fisheries, Inc.

v

SS President Grant.5

Using this method, the court selected the prejudgment interest rates of 4.11% for 1992 and 3.54% for
199 3.

Eyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1994).
2 275 U.S. 303 ( 1 927).
th Cir. 200 1 ).
3 Baker v. Hazelwoo d (In Re Exxon Valdez), 270 F.3d 1 2 1 5, 1253 (9
th
4 768 F.2d 1 066 (9
Cir. 1 985).
th Cir. 1 984).
5 730 F.2d 1280 (9
1
1

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that state law should govern the determination of prejudgment

Under Erie Railroad v.
6
Tompldns, federal courts sitting in diversity cases must apply state substantive law and federal
procedural law. Although Erie principles also apply to courts exercising pendant jurisdiction, 7 the basis
of a federal court's j urisdiction is considered irrelevant for Erie purposes. In Witzman v. Gross, the court
interest, suggesting that prejudgment interest is a matter of substantive law.

held that "where state law supplies the rule of decision, it is the duty of the federal courts to ascertain
8
Since federal jurisdiction in this case arises under 28 U.S .C. § 1441(c), Erie

and apply that law."

principles apply equally in this situation.
It is considered

stare decisis that prejudgment interest is a substantive part of a plaintiffs claim,

not procedural for Erie purposes.

9

However, federal law can still preempt state law under the supremacy

clause.

Where a party argues that federal admiralty law preempts state law, as the defendant did here,
0
the court applies a "balancing test that weighs state and federal interests on a case by case basis." 1
In reaching its decision, the court applied the holding of In

re Exxon Valedez, 11 which stated that

state law claims for economic recovery are not preempted by federal law. Since, in part, the Alaskan
state law claims brought by plaintiff sought to recover for economic harm in the form of prejudgment
interest, state law was deemed to not have been preempted by federal law. While the defendant argued
2
Columbia Brick Works v. Royal Insurance Company of America 1 suggested that
federal law should be applicable in this case, the 9th Circuit distinguished this holding, stating that the

that the holding of

claim brought in the

Columbia case was controlled by federal admiralty law. Therefore, the holding in

Columbia suggests that prej udgment interest prescribed by federal law must be applied in cases
only. Here, since the claim arises under Alaskan state law only, the

governed by admiralty principles

court held that prejudgment interest should be applied at rates applicable under state law.
The defendant made a last ditch effort to use judicial estoppel to bar the application of state law
on appeal, since the plaintiff had argued solely for the application of federal law while in district court.
However, the court dismissed this argument, noting that the plaintiff, in addition to rates prescribed by
federal law, had properly requested the application of the interest rate of 10.5% available under Alaskan
state law in the alternative.
The 9th Circuit concluded that the district court had erred in not applying Alaskan state law and
its interest rate of 10.5% a year. The case was, therefore, reversed and remanded to apply the correct
interest rate, and to adjudicate the dispute as to whether the interest should be compound or simple under
Alaskan State law.
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6 304 U.S. 54 ( 1 938).

Mangold v Cal. Pub. Utils Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1 995).
th Cir. 1 998).
8 148 F.3d 988, 990 (8
th Cir. 1 992) ("In diversity jurisdiction, state law governs all
9 Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstom, 957 F.2d 707, 7 14 (9
awards of prejudgment interest."); Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machs., Inc., 22 1 F.3d 1 1 20, 1 134 (lOth Cir. 2002)
("Prejudgment interest in a diversity action is thus a substantive matter governed by state law.").
10
In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1 2 1 5, 1 2 5 1 (9th Cir. 200 1).
II fd.
at 1 253.
12
768 F.2d 1 066 (9th Cir. 1 985).
2
7

